Mais en fait c'est quoi le Darfour, à part des titres de 20h qu'on absorbe sans y prêter attention et sans lever la tête de l'assiette de soupe ?On se souvient vaguement que George Clooney est venu y tourner une pub pour Nespresso, que l'Arche de Zoé y a acheté un lot de jolis petits nafricains... pour le reste, c'est un peu confus. Faut dire qu'ils y mettent du leur : rarement vu une situation aussi bordélique.
Affrontement ethnique d'abord : "Arabes" d'un côté, "Africains" de l'autre. Mais chaque ethnie se décompose en autant de tribus, factions, clans, familles... Affrontement de mode de vie ensuite : agriculteurs sédentaires d'un côté, éleveurs nomades de l'autre. Affrontement politiquement enfin : gouvernement central contre autonomistes régionaux. Le statut actuel de victimes des seconds les rend plus spontanément sympathiques, ce qui ne devraient pas perdurer trop longtemps s'ils parvenaient à leurs fins.
Ca ressemble un peu à une partie de foot avec une dizaine d'équipes qui joueraient sur le même terrain, parfois en même temps, parfois non, faisant et défaisant des alliances... on dira ce qu'on veut, mais le conflit Israélo Palestinien est mieux scénarisé : les uns d'un côté, les autres de l'autre, un minuscule morceau de territoire au milieu, et c'est parti : c'est tout aussi meurtrier, mais au moins c'est plus facile à suivre.
J'aurais pu (ré)écrire moi-même l'histoire du conflit du Darfour... mais je me suis dit qu'un bon vieux copier - coller ferait tout aussi bien l'affaire. Alors, bon, pour ceux qui ont un peu perdu le fil, un petit résumé des épisodes précédents :
The current conflict in Darfur started around February 2003, when two rebel groups - SLA/M and JEM - took up arms against the Government of Soudan. The main fighting occurred from April 2003 to the beginning of 2004. The rebels' primary grievances were Darfur's economic marginalization and lack of political power. The favourable outcome for rebels in South Sudan conflict—with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement—is also noted as a motivating factor for the Darfur insurgency. 
In mid 2003, GoS decided to arm and equip horse- and camelback militia from several Arab tribes ('Janjaweed') in order to fight the rebels. This changed the traditional power balance in favour of the nomads. During co-ordinated military operations, the Janjaweed is mainly being used as a ground force supported by GoS from the air (helicopters/ attack planes) or the ground. Claiming that the rebels hide in friendly villages, the Janjaweed started systematic attacks on Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit villages following a 'scorched earth' policy (looting, burning, etc.). This has given an extremely violent character to the conflict, leading to a huge number of deaths (400,000) and massive displacements of population (2.450.000 IDP and 250.000 refugees in Chad).
In mid 2003, GoS decided to arm and equip horse- and camelback militia from several Arab tribes ('Janjaweed') in order to fight the rebels. This changed the traditional power balance in favour of the nomads. During co-ordinated military operations, the Janjaweed is mainly being used as a ground force supported by GoS from the air (helicopters/ attack planes) or the ground. Claiming that the rebels hide in friendly villages, the Janjaweed started systematic attacks on Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit villages following a 'scorched earth' policy (looting, burning, etc.). This has given an extremely violent character to the conflict, leading to a huge number of deaths (400,000) and massive displacements of population (2.450.000 IDP and 250.000 refugees in Chad).
During 2007, wide-spread fighting and violence in Darfur have continued to displace people into camps and rural IDP locations, challenged sustained humanitarian access to populations in need and further eroded people’s coping mechanisms and livelihoods. Over 200,000 people have been newly displaced since the beginning of the year, overstretching the capacity of existing camp facilities in all three Darfur states and dangerously depleting natural resources. Many humanitarian indicators that had stabilized since the massive humanitarian intervention in 2004/2005, have started to deteriorate as the impact of a year-long restricted humanitarian access to rural locations and the limitations of “remote control” programme management strategies are starting to be felt. Humanitarian indicators such as global acute malnutrition, crude mortality rates, access to clean water, school enrollment, access to primary health care and immunization rates have all started to gradually deteriorate; endangering the health and well-being of an already highly vulnerable population.
In the absence of sustainable ceasefire, a widely supported political agreement and a fully and strategically deployed hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force (UNAMID), security continues to be the central challenge of Darfur. The protracted conflict has eroded traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, social norms and structures, and polarized relations, resulting in increased inter and intra-tribal tensions and fighting. The fracturing of rebel factions, the emergence of new, independently operating Arab militia groups and the ongoing proliferation of arms has led to an exponential increase in banditry. Aid agencies find themselves increasingly at risk, as illustrated by the 65% increase in the carjacking of humanitarian vehicles during the first half of 2007 in comparison to the previous year. While the number of direct military confrontations has decreased in North Darfur, it remains a major source of insecurity in South and West Darfur. Increased instability on both sides of the borders of Chad and CAR and the presence of Chadian opposition groups inside Darfur further add to the volatile security environment.
Although UNAMID is expected to provide better protection for a number of IDP concentrations in 2008, the force’s ability to provide physical security is likely to be limited during the initial start-up phase. Therefore – and given the wide spectrum of security challenges across Darfur - rural areas are expected to remain volatile and humanitarian access limited. Also, popular expectations are so desperately high, that some form of negative backlash against UNAMID will be hard to avoid. UNAMID’s capacity to provide effective protection is further limited by disgruntled armed factions that target its forces, as well as the threat of terrorism. Meanwhile, a positive outcome of the Darfur peace talks creates some stability in areas where a ceasefire takes hold, but provides an additional incentive for other groups to escalate fighting. During the talks, intense fighting occasionally erupts as factions try to strengthen their hand or – alternatively - attempt to fight their way to the negotiating table. The increased politicization of IDP camps provides a volatile backdrop of the talks as negatively perceived developments translate directly in a passionate popular response. The 2008 Census adds a further sensitive political dynamic to a polarized population yearning for peace.
The effect of violence on markets and agricultural production continues to cause hardship and suffering to the civilian populations. The economy has suffered as traditional trading relationships and routes have been destroyed. In some areas, agricultural production has virtually ground to a halt as displaced populations are unable to access their fields. Further impoverishment is made probable as a result of the nearly universal destruction or attrition of livelihood options coupled with the erosion of coping mechanisms. Increased migration over the past years has heightened tensions over natural resources. Water, firewood and land for grazing remain flashpoints for localized conflicts and fuel existing tensions.
The ongoing displacements and occupation of villages and the imposition of restrictions to access water and resources remain protection concerns in Darfur. The increasing politicization and militarization of some IDP camps, with armed youth groups and militia roaming the camps, is another significant protection concern that has resulted in a general increase of violence within the camps; especially against women. Displaced youths are becoming increasingly radicalized as their lives show less promise and rifts with their traditional leaders grow. Forced recruitment of child soldiers is an ongoing concern in some regions, as well as the abduction of children and to some extent women. Gender-based violence is prevalent in areas of conflict and where women venture out of IDP camps and settlements for firewood.
Humanitarian organizations continued to struggle to protect humanitarian space throughout 2007. Although the signing of the Joint Communiqué has significantly facilitated humanitarian operations and administrative procedures, its implementation remains uneven; especially at the local level. Meanwhile, escalating insecurity has forced the withdrawal of many organizations from rural locations, leaving desperately vulnerable populations with only the bare minimum of support. The strategic presence of UNAMID, however, provides the opportunity to consolidate assistance to a number of peripheral IDP concentrations. Rather than predominantly organizing rural assistance from the main towns, localized outreach can be organized from these peripheral locations into surrounding rural areas - with affected populations moving in and out of these locations. At the same time, the size and presence of UNAMID requires a stronger emphasis on the separation and protection of humanitarian space. As a result, effective camp coordination for the multitude of IDP concentrations and principled general humanitarian coordination is paramount. The capacity to advocate for humanitarian principles and negotiate access with the ever-growing number of rebel factions, needs to be strengthened.
Despite increased government pressure on IDPs to return and on the international community to assist in the rehabilitation of rural villages, the continued volatile security environment in Darfur does not - generally - provide the necessary conditions for a safe, voluntary and dignified return. What is more, safety itself is not a sufficient condition for return, given the prevailing expectations regarding the provision of basic services and compensation for suffered losses. In certain cases, armed factions also discourage the return of IDPs for political reasons. As such, the situation across Darfur is unlikely to be conducive to large-scale returns unless the political situation stabilizes and the root causes of the conflict are addressed. However, small-scale voluntary returns, including refugees currently in Chad, are expected to continue in pockets of relative security and agencies continue to strengthen information systems to verify the voluntariness of returns. A stronger response also needs to be formulated for the substantial percentage of the displaced population who opts to remain in an urban setting.
WEST DARFUR PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS
West Darfur will continue to represent a complex emergency situation in 2008, with two-third of the population to some degree reliant upon the provision of humanitarian assistance. Insecurity will continue to represent a significant challenge, reflecting an unstable and tense environment. Protracted fighting and tribal/ethnic tensions will likely result in further displacement and adversely affect the forthcoming harvest. Thus, livelihoods and local coping mechanisms will be further compromised, while levels of environmental stress rise. These external forces are likely to further foment insecurity within camps and other areas of displacement. Finally, without the continued support of donor funding for West Darfur, it is feared that critical shortfalls may be experienced in the implementation of an effective and efficient humanitarian response.
Current Security Situation in West Darfur
In November and December, insecurity continued to displace civilians and inhibit the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Rampant banditry and attacks targeting humanitarian staff continued to hinder operations in November and December. In all West Darfur states, road travel is restricted to major towns. To date in 2007, 128 humanitarian vehicles have been hijacked, 74 convoys attacked, 58 humanitarian personnel arrested or detained, and 12 staff killed, according to OCHA. The international community is awaiting the GNU’s renewal of the humanitarian moratorium, which expires on January 31, 2008. The moratorium eases requirements for visas, travel permits, and importation of relief commodities for NGOs working in Darfur, which would otherwise be subject to provisions of Sudan’s Voluntary and Humanitarian Work Act of 2006. A failure to renew the moratorium in the coming weeks would bring NGO operations to a halt.
In the absence of sustainable ceasefire, a widely supported political agreement and a fully and strategically deployed hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force (UNAMID), security continues to be the central challenge of Darfur. The protracted conflict has eroded traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, social norms and structures, and polarized relations, resulting in increased inter and intra-tribal tensions and fighting. The fracturing of rebel factions, the emergence of new, independently operating Arab militia groups and the ongoing proliferation of arms has led to an exponential increase in banditry. Aid agencies find themselves increasingly at risk, as illustrated by the 65% increase in the carjacking of humanitarian vehicles during the first half of 2007 in comparison to the previous year. While the number of direct military confrontations has decreased in North Darfur, it remains a major source of insecurity in South and West Darfur. Increased instability on both sides of the borders of Chad and CAR and the presence of Chadian opposition groups inside Darfur further add to the volatile security environment.
Although UNAMID is expected to provide better protection for a number of IDP concentrations in 2008, the force’s ability to provide physical security is likely to be limited during the initial start-up phase. Therefore – and given the wide spectrum of security challenges across Darfur - rural areas are expected to remain volatile and humanitarian access limited. Also, popular expectations are so desperately high, that some form of negative backlash against UNAMID will be hard to avoid. UNAMID’s capacity to provide effective protection is further limited by disgruntled armed factions that target its forces, as well as the threat of terrorism. Meanwhile, a positive outcome of the Darfur peace talks creates some stability in areas where a ceasefire takes hold, but provides an additional incentive for other groups to escalate fighting. During the talks, intense fighting occasionally erupts as factions try to strengthen their hand or – alternatively - attempt to fight their way to the negotiating table. The increased politicization of IDP camps provides a volatile backdrop of the talks as negatively perceived developments translate directly in a passionate popular response. The 2008 Census adds a further sensitive political dynamic to a polarized population yearning for peace.
The effect of violence on markets and agricultural production continues to cause hardship and suffering to the civilian populations. The economy has suffered as traditional trading relationships and routes have been destroyed. In some areas, agricultural production has virtually ground to a halt as displaced populations are unable to access their fields. Further impoverishment is made probable as a result of the nearly universal destruction or attrition of livelihood options coupled with the erosion of coping mechanisms. Increased migration over the past years has heightened tensions over natural resources. Water, firewood and land for grazing remain flashpoints for localized conflicts and fuel existing tensions.
The ongoing displacements and occupation of villages and the imposition of restrictions to access water and resources remain protection concerns in Darfur. The increasing politicization and militarization of some IDP camps, with armed youth groups and militia roaming the camps, is another significant protection concern that has resulted in a general increase of violence within the camps; especially against women. Displaced youths are becoming increasingly radicalized as their lives show less promise and rifts with their traditional leaders grow. Forced recruitment of child soldiers is an ongoing concern in some regions, as well as the abduction of children and to some extent women. Gender-based violence is prevalent in areas of conflict and where women venture out of IDP camps and settlements for firewood.
Humanitarian organizations continued to struggle to protect humanitarian space throughout 2007. Although the signing of the Joint Communiqué has significantly facilitated humanitarian operations and administrative procedures, its implementation remains uneven; especially at the local level. Meanwhile, escalating insecurity has forced the withdrawal of many organizations from rural locations, leaving desperately vulnerable populations with only the bare minimum of support. The strategic presence of UNAMID, however, provides the opportunity to consolidate assistance to a number of peripheral IDP concentrations. Rather than predominantly organizing rural assistance from the main towns, localized outreach can be organized from these peripheral locations into surrounding rural areas - with affected populations moving in and out of these locations. At the same time, the size and presence of UNAMID requires a stronger emphasis on the separation and protection of humanitarian space. As a result, effective camp coordination for the multitude of IDP concentrations and principled general humanitarian coordination is paramount. The capacity to advocate for humanitarian principles and negotiate access with the ever-growing number of rebel factions, needs to be strengthened.
Despite increased government pressure on IDPs to return and on the international community to assist in the rehabilitation of rural villages, the continued volatile security environment in Darfur does not - generally - provide the necessary conditions for a safe, voluntary and dignified return. What is more, safety itself is not a sufficient condition for return, given the prevailing expectations regarding the provision of basic services and compensation for suffered losses. In certain cases, armed factions also discourage the return of IDPs for political reasons. As such, the situation across Darfur is unlikely to be conducive to large-scale returns unless the political situation stabilizes and the root causes of the conflict are addressed. However, small-scale voluntary returns, including refugees currently in Chad, are expected to continue in pockets of relative security and agencies continue to strengthen information systems to verify the voluntariness of returns. A stronger response also needs to be formulated for the substantial percentage of the displaced population who opts to remain in an urban setting.
WEST DARFUR PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS
West Darfur will continue to represent a complex emergency situation in 2008, with two-third of the population to some degree reliant upon the provision of humanitarian assistance. Insecurity will continue to represent a significant challenge, reflecting an unstable and tense environment. Protracted fighting and tribal/ethnic tensions will likely result in further displacement and adversely affect the forthcoming harvest. Thus, livelihoods and local coping mechanisms will be further compromised, while levels of environmental stress rise. These external forces are likely to further foment insecurity within camps and other areas of displacement. Finally, without the continued support of donor funding for West Darfur, it is feared that critical shortfalls may be experienced in the implementation of an effective and efficient humanitarian response.
Current Security Situation in West Darfur
In November and December, insecurity continued to displace civilians and inhibit the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Rampant banditry and attacks targeting humanitarian staff continued to hinder operations in November and December. In all West Darfur states, road travel is restricted to major towns. To date in 2007, 128 humanitarian vehicles have been hijacked, 74 convoys attacked, 58 humanitarian personnel arrested or detained, and 12 staff killed, according to OCHA. The international community is awaiting the GNU’s renewal of the humanitarian moratorium, which expires on January 31, 2008. The moratorium eases requirements for visas, travel permits, and importation of relief commodities for NGOs working in Darfur, which would otherwise be subject to provisions of Sudan’s Voluntary and Humanitarian Work Act of 2006. A failure to renew the moratorium in the coming weeks would bring NGO operations to a halt.
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